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THEORY AND EMPIRICISM IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE 
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Doing developmental psychology and trying to understand these processes sometimes we should also ask 
about the role of theory and empiricism in building knowledge on human development in life span. This text 
is a part of discussion, initiated by Adam Niemczyński, about the importance of the theory of development, 
and the dominance of empiricism in psychology. The development is theoretical not empirical concept so 
gathering facts about it should rely on theory. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of theory and re-
flection about the development and collected empirical data, which are becoming meaningful in the light of 
a particular theory.
One can hardly disagree with Adam Niem-
czyński’s thesis regarding the dominance of 
empiricism in psychology and its important 
position in research on human development. 
It is not for nothing that the establishment of 
the world’s first psychological laboratory by 
Wilhelm Wundt has been recognized as the 
symbolic date of the foundation of psychol-
ogy, though Wundt not so much established 
a new discipline as implemented a new method 
(Stachowski & Dobroczyński, 2008). Wundt’s 
introduction of the experimental method was 
important for scientific psychology, making it 
an empirical science on the pattern of natural 
sciences. According to some scholars, psychol-
ogists have become more methodologically 
rigorous than Wundt himself wanted them to 
be, or even more so than was the case in other 
disciplines, such as physics or biology, which 
have never broken their bonds with philoso-
phy or neglected more general reflection on 
the problems subjected to empirical verifica-
tion (cf. Toulmin & Leary, 1985). As historians 
of psychological thought observe (Stachows-
ki & Dobroczyński, 2008), twentieth-century 
psychology was much more interested in meth-
odological problems than in the subject matter 
of research, and the situation seems to be sim-
ilar today. The dominance of methodological 
problems in doing psychology is reflected also 
in the curricula of psychological studies, where 
classes in methodology occupy an increasing 
amount of place, which certainly has influ-
ence on the beliefs of psychology graduates 
regarding the key and central issues of this 
discipline. Fascination with method as well as 
the belief that it is method that gives psychol-
ogy the status of a science and determines the 
chance of building psychological knowledge 
has taken the form of “dogmatic methodism” 
(Stachowski & Dobroczyński, 2008), according 
to which what guarantees success in science is 
the use of specific methods. It is believed that, 
in times when the indicator of scientificity is 
empiricism, psychology as a science must be 
done within the framework of empirical meth-
odology. What is interesting, refusing to allow 
any methods other than empirical in science, 
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empiricism does not attempt to show why 
empirical evidence is better or more valuable 
than other evidence, merely stressing that this 
evidence is provided by empiricism (Indick, 
2002). It would be wise to ask if this is a suffi-
cient and convincing argument.
It is worth noting that Wundt did not con-
sider experiment to be the only appropriate 
method but rather stressed that pure experi-
mental methods are appropriate in the case of 
a narrow range of mental activity and mental 
phenomena. He maintained that psychology 
should remain sensitive to philosophical anal-
ysis and claimed that to create true and 
complete science it was necessary to rely both 
on experimental methods and on rational anal-
yses (Toulmin & Leary, 1985). Distinguishing 
two currents in psychology: experimental and 
historical-cultural, Wundt did not present 
a vision of their integration, seeing prospects 
only for historical-cultural psychology, which 
– according to his predictions, already known 
today to have been wrong – was to dominate 
experimental psychology, also referred to as 
physiological (Stachowski, 2002).
Lev Vygotsky made an attempt to unify 
these two currents, giving rise to the histori-
cal-cultural theory of development, according 
to which development is conditioned both by 
biological factors and by social and cultural 
experience. Taking into account the complexi-
ty and multiple determinants of development, 
he presented the specificity of human de-
velopment by pointing to the development 
of higher mental functions (Stachowski & 
Dobroczyński 2008).
Introducing experiment into psychological 
research and stressing its role in building psy-
chology as a science, Wundt treated it as a tool 
supporting self-observation, which means 
he did not entirely negate the importance of 
the previously used introspection but rather 
replaced philosophical introspection with ex-
perimental introspection (Stachowski, 2002).
A figure who made a significant contribu-
tion to building psychology as an empirical 
science, somewhat forgotten by psychologists, 
was Brentano, who also wanted psychology 
to be based on experience. He understood it 
differently than Wundt, however. Address-
ing the issue of inner experience and having 
distinguished contents from acts in mental 
processes, Brentano focused on the latter, 
whereas Wundt as well as other psychologists 
of his times focused on contents. The method 
affording access to mental acts was supposed to 
be inner perception, affording a possibility of 
accessing the phenomena of one’s own mental 
life. Believing inner observation to be impossi-
ble, he rejected introspection and asserted that 
a person could study his or her own experi-
ences only retrospectively (Tatarkiewicz 1990; 
Stachowski 2002).
Striving for objectivity, certainty, and accu-
racy in psychology, we rely on experimental 
methods, quantitative methods, and statis-
tical measures, often deprecating qualitative 
methods, not to mention reflection or in-
tellectual speculation on human nature and 
development. Reliance on physicalism and the 
belief in the possibility of explaining human 
behavior based on physiological mechanisms 
carries a risk of reductionism. The develop-
ment of neuroscience, intensive in recent 
years, additionally enhances this direction 
of thinking and doing psychology, leading to 
the belief that we will get to know the human 
being by getting to know the work of his or her 
brain, and thus creating an illusion that we can 
abandon the study of the mind. The following 
question arises: is it possible to understand the 
human being and his or her development sole-
ly on the basis of biological processes? Does the 
essence of human psychological development 
consist in gradually moving beyond that which 
is biological – in transgressing one’s biological 
nature? Is that which constitutes the essence of 
the human being and his or her development 
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fully observable through the senses? Does 
ignoring first-person data and adopting the 
third-person perspective with its focus on the 
study of brain activity not lead to resignation 
from the personal dimension and does it not 
reduce the person to the physical or physiolog-
ical dimension?
It is impossible to understand human nature 
and development without taking into account 
the three dimensions in which a person func-
tions: soma, psyche, and polis (Brzezińska, 
2007). This implies the necessity of consid-
ering not only biological factors but also 
environmental and cultural ones as well as in-
terrelations among them when attempting to 
describe and understand life course human 
development; it also implies the necessity of 
considering that which comes from and affects 
the individual. To understand the human being 
with all the wealth of his or her experience and 
with all the complexity of mental life, psychol-
ogy cannot deprive itself of the first-person 
perspective and give up what is accessible only 
to the experiencing self.
At present, immense weight is attached to 
empirical research, data collection, and in-
creasingly sophisticated statistical analyses that 
are supposed to yield answers to questions con-
cerning the course, patterns, and determinants 
of development. One can ask the following 
question: is it necessary for empirical research 
to be based on a theory, or is it legitimate to be 
content with facts only? Observing the focus 
of contemporary psychology on empirical re-
search, research instruments, and statistical 
analyses, which are often not accompanied by 
more general reflection on development and its 
essence, and seeing that the research conduct-
ed is frequently not firmly based on theory, one 
has the impression that some scholars believe 
that facts will speak for themselves and that 
the results of more and more advanced statis-
tical analyses will replace reflection on human 
development, its logic, and its aim. The focus 
on methods and their psychometric properties 
sometimes leads to a situation in which one 
may have the impression that the researcher 
does not always know what he or she is investi-
gating but knows that he or she is investigating 
it well, deriving this information from appro-
priate statistical measures. William Indick 
(2002) observes that, in modern science, the 
force of argument is often reduced to symbols 
such as p or r, and the power of statistics is 
often equated with the power of intellect.
Without negating the legitimacy and im-
portance of empirical studies in the process 
of gaining knowledge and understanding of 
the human being and human development, it 
is worth stressing that their value and contri-
bution to the building of our knowledge about 
the person developing in the course of life is 
determined by their being embedded and 
considered in the context of theory – by more 
general reflection on them.
Kelly (1955) believed that theory makes 
it possible to link facts so that, having many 
of them, we can explain them together. Thus, 
theory enables us to organize observations and 
give meaning to the information collected. As 
the French mathematician Jules-Henri Poincare 
said, “Science is built of facts the way a house is 
built of bricks: but an accumulation of facts is 
no more science than a pile of bricks is a house.” 
Facts alone are not enough; their understand-
ing and organization requires a theory, which 
also indicates the direction and area of research. 
In the case of the psychology of human devel-
opment, the role of theory seems to be special 
because, as Maria Przetacznik-Gierowska 
says, “Theoretical assumptions and premis-
es as well as value judgments seem to be… an 
inevitable step in constructing the concept of 
development. The definition of this concept 
should precede data collection rather than fol-
low from data” (Przetacznik-Gierowska, 1993, 
p. 13). Agreeing with the author that devel-
opment is a theoretical rather than empirical 
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concept, it is hardly possible not to share the 
opinion that in order to collect facts concerning 
development it is necessary to rely on theo-
ry and to adopt a particular understanding of 
development. It is theory that will determine 
what kind of changes that can be empirically 
investigated we recognize as representing devel-
opment. Empirical research alone will not allow 
us to formulate a definition of development or 
to decide whether or not a particular observed 
change is a developmental change. Only by an-
alyzing and interpreting the collected empirical 
data in the light of a particular theory is it pos-
sible to give meaning to them and to assess to 
what extent they attest to development.
In order to determine what individual 
human development is and what nature it has, 
it is necessary to adopt certain assumptions 
regarding human nature. Is man an active and 
creative being, having an innate capacity for 
development and self-improvement and capa-
ble of creating himself/herself and the path of 
his or her development – or a reactive being, 
molded by the environment and passively 
subject to its influences? Each theory of de-
velopment is based on certain anthropological 
and methodological assumptions, more or less 
explicit. Assumptions regarding human nature 
largely determine our thinking not only about 
the mechanisms and determinants of devel-
opment but also about its direction, aim, and 
essence. These assumptions cannot be empiri-
cally tested, however. Empirical research does 
not make it possible to ultimately decide what 
human nature and development are like. It is 
possible to approach the knowledge of their 
nature, but empiricism does not allow for mak-
ing definitive conclusions.
Striving to understand and capture the 
meaning of development, we also to some 
extent refer to the meaning of human life, in 
which this development takes place and whose 
important aspect it constitutes. Capturing the 
essence of human life and placing it in the con-
text of development is a challenge for the theory 
of individual human development. Could it 
respond to this challenge while remaining in 
the positivist paradigm, relying exclusively on 
what can be empirically investigated and on 
what is observable through the senses?
There arises the question regarding the pos-
sibility of formulating a life course theory of 
development with its complexity and multiple 
aspects only on the basis of facts collected by 
means of tools developed by empirical psychol-
ogy, without intellectual speculation on human 
nature and development.
 It is also worth reflecting on whether de-
velopmental psychology should only describe 
“what is” or whether it should address “what 
should be” – in other words, should the object 
of interest of developmental psychology be re-
stricted to facts – to describing and explaining 
them – or should developmental psycholo-
gy have a normative character? Is it possible 
to define the logic of developmental changes 
and explain why a higher stage is better than 
a lower one, why we treat the observed change 
as a manifestation of development, if we have 
no normative criterion of development? After 
all, the very fact that a change takes place, that 
a certain characteristic or ability appears at 
a later stage of life, and that older people dif-
fer in some respects from younger ones does 
not necessarily mean that development has oc-
curred. If any change or novelty were to attest 
to development, then we would have to con-
clude that everything that changes develops, 
and we would thus lose the meaning of the 
concept of development and the specificity of 
developmental change (cf. Smith & Voneche, 
2008). A question arises: can developmental 
change criteria be inferred from empiricism? 
Is it possible to determine the aim of develop-
ment solely on the basis of empirical research 
and on what is observable through the senses?
In my opinion, it is not possible to do psy-
chology in a sensible way without openness to 
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reflection and to logical rather than only em-
pirical arguments, without the acceptance of 
specific assumptions, without evaluating, and 
– finally – without reference to philosophy and 
a broader perspective on development. Just like 
the development of any field of science, the 
development of the psychology of individual 
development is possible thanks to constantly 
posing new questions, discerning new prob-
lems, thanks to interpretations of human 
behavior going beyond merely commenting 
on the results of statistical analyses – thanks to 
intellectual speculation and “scientific imag-
ination” (Toulmin & Leary, 1985). Far from 
negating the importance of empirical research 
and statistical analyses, it is hardly legitimate to 
accept that science is to be restricted to them. It 
seems that the best way is the middle way – or, 
in other words, a dialectical approach, com-
bining empirical research, the psychometric 
approach, and quantitative methods with more 
general reflection and intellectual speculation.
Professor Adam Niemczyński’s initiative of 
reflection on the theory of individual human 
development and its significance in empirical 
research is highly valuable. Reflection on what 
and how we do and from where we derive the 
belief that we do it well is immensely important. 
And if even if the diverse positions on this issue 
do not change in the course of the debate, its 
valuable outcome will be a greater awareness of 
the path we have chosen in seeking the essence, 
meaning, and purpose of individual human de-
velopment, an awareness of its advantages and 
limitations, and perhaps greater openness to 
those who have chosen a different path.
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TEORIA I EMPIRIA W ROZUMIENIU ROZWOJU W BIEGU ŻYCIA
STRESZCZENIE
Uprawiając psychologię rozwoju człowieka i starając się jak najpełniej rozwój ten zrozumieć, warto czasami 
zadać pytanie o rolę teorii i empirii w budowaniu wiedzy na temat rozwoju człowieka w biegu jego życia. Ni-
niejszy tekst to głos w dyskusji zainicjowanej przez Adama Niemczyńskiego wokół znaczenia teorii rozwoju, 
a także dominacji empiryzmu w psychologii. Przyjmując, że rozwój to pojęcie teoretyczne, a nie empiryczne, 
bo z empirii nie wyprowadzimy definicji rozwoju, chcąc gromadzić fakty na temat rozwoju, trzeba oprzeć się 
na teorii. Trudno zatem przecenić znaczenie teorii i refleksji wokół rozwoju i gromadzonych danych empirycz-
nych, które nabierają znaczenia i sensu w świetle określonej teorii. 
